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SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: WHY THIS EVIDENTIARY CONCEPT
SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFORMED INTO SEPARATE CAUSES OF
ACTION
Jason B. Hendren*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2000, the Supreme Court of Arkansas decided the
case of Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co.,' and joined the growing number
of jurisdictions expressly declining to recognize intentional first party spo-
liation of evidence as a separate cause of action in tort.2 The court defined
spoliation as "the intentional destruction of evidence and when established,
[the] fact finder may draw [an] inference that [the] evidence destroyed was
unfavorable to [the] party responsible for its spoliation. ' 3
Subsequently, proponents attempting to transform spoliation from an
evidentiary concept to a basis for multiple causes of action submitted House
Bill 2432 during the 84th General Assembly.4 Had this measure become
law, new causes of action would have been created for intentional and neg-
ligent spoliation of evidence. The measure failed to distinguish between
first party spoliation and third party spoliation, but would have allowed
causes of actions against third parties, who could have been held liable for
disposing of documents that might have been useful in establishing a claim
or defense of another party in separate, often far-removed litigation.
Fortunately, House Bill 2432 did not become law, but it remains to be
seen whether similar legislation will be proposed during a future legislative
session. The purpose of this article is to discuss the rationale of Goff v. Har-
old Ives Trucking Co. and similar decisions around the country to illustrate
why Arkansas should not adopt inherently speculative and hopelessly circu-
lar causes of action for spoliation of evidence.
* Jason B. Hendren is a partner with the law firm of Friday, Eldredge & Clark, L.L.P.
in Little Rock, Arkansas, where he concentrates his practice on the defense of cases involv-
ing alleged medical/dental malpractice and medical products liability.
1. 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000).
2. Id. at 150,27 S.W.3d at 391.
3. Id. at 146, 27 S.W.3d at 388 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed.
19%) (bratkets inse-edi by the co-art)).
4. H.B. 2432, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003).
5. Id. § (b)(1) (establishing the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence); id. § (c)(1)
(establishing the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence).
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II. DISCUSSION
Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co. involved a motorist injured in a colli-
sion with a tractor-trailer rig driven by the defendant's employee. 6 The
plaintiffs, who were husband and wife, first filed suit against the defendant
trucking company in federal district court alleging negligence in connection
with the collision.7 During the course of discovery, the plaintiffs learned
that some of the logs showing the employee's hours of service had either
been lost or destroyed. 8 Federal law required such logs to be kept for a
minimum of six months. 9 Instead of seeking discovery sanctions because of
the missing logs,10 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding a claim
for spoliation." The plaintiffs, however, later voluntarily nonsuited that
claim when the federal district court refused to allow the plaintiffs to submit
a claim for punitive damages based on spoliation.12 After the jury returned a
verdict awarding the plaintiffs damages based on the negligence claim, the
plaintiffs filed suit in Pulaski County Circuit Court for the purpose of reas-
serting only the spoliation claim against the defendant. 3
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the employee's logs contained
information relevant to their negligence claim and that the destruction of
those logs deprived them of their opportunity to recover full compensa-
tion. 14 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because Arkansas does not recognize the tort
of spoliation of evidence, and even if such a tort was cognizable, the plain-
tiffs could still not prevail because they had already won the negligence
action.1 5 The trial court granted the defendant's motion and the plaintiffs
appealed.16 After a lengthy discussion of its thorough research on this issue
of first impression, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.' 7
As the court observed, few jurisdictions have recognized spoliation as
an independent tort.18 An intermediate appellate court in California first
recognized this new tort in 1984, based upon the idea that for every wrong
6. 342 Ark. at 144, 27 S.W.3d at 387.
7. Id. at 145, 27 S.W.3d at 387.
8. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 387-88.
9. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388.
10. Id. at 148 n.3, 27 S.W.3d at 390 n.3.
11. Id. at 145, 27 S.W.3d at 388.
12. Goff, 342 Ark. At 145, 27 S.W.3d at 388.
13. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388.
14. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388.
15. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388.
16. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388.
17. Id. at 151, 27 S.W.3d at 391.
18. Golf, 342 Ark. at 146, 27 S.W.3d at 388.
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there is a remedy.' 9 The few courts which initially followed California in
embracing an independent cause of action for spoliation of evidence cited
the following three reasons:
(1) Permitting the independent tort action promotes the desire to protect
testimonial candor and the integrity of the adversarial system;
20
(2) The tort protects the probable expectation of a favorable judgment or
defense in future litigation;
2 1
(3) Often the traditional evidentiary remedies and sanctions are not ef-
fective enough or available to deter spoliation.
22
Over time, however, several of these jurisdictions began changing
course based upon reasoning similar to that of the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas in Goff. As the Court pointed out, California's highest court ended its
approximately fifteen year experiment with spoliation as a cause of action
by holding that the tort would no longer be recognized.23 While acknowl-
edging the universal consensus that intentional destruction of evidence
should not be condoned, the California Supreme Court ultimately decided
that such conduct does not justify the creation of tort liability.24 Of the six
jurisdictions cited by the Supreme Court of Arkansas as recognizing a cause
of action for spoliation, subsequent case law from two of those jurisdictions
suggest that they, too, may soon join California in reconsidering their earlier
decisions.25
19. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388 (quoting Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832,
837 (Ct. App. 1984)).
20. Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 2002) (citing Petrik
v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1319 (111. App. Ct. 1986)).
21. Id. (citing Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Alaska 1986)).
22. Id. (citing Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont. 1999)).
23. Goff, 342 Ark. at 146, 27 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998)).
24. Id. at 146-47, 27 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515).
The California Supreme Court subsequently decided that negligent spoliation did not justify
liability in tort. See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P. 2d 223 (Cal. 1999).
25. Goff, 342 Ark. at 146, 27 S.W.3d at 388-89 (citing Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d
1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Hazen, 718 P.2d 456; Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628
A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 180 F.3d 294
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993); and Cole-
man v. Eddy Potash, 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) (overruled on other grounds by Delgado v.
Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 114K (2001)). Florida appellate courts are now divided on
the issue of whether spoliation should be recognized as an independent tort. See Martino v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 835 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting Bondu, 473 So.
2d 1307). One justice of the Ohio Supreme Court has expressed the following view: "In
Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 67 Ohio St. 3d 28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (1993),
this court adopted the spoliation tort (placing this court among the minority of jurisdictions to
20051
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In coming to its own conclusion in Goff that first party intentional spo-
liation should not be recognized as a tort, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
noted a number of nontort remedies for addressing litigation misconduct
such as spoliation.26 The primary nontort remedy cited was the evidentiary
inference, omnia praesumntur contra spoliator, which translates from the
Latin as "all things are presumed against a spoliator. '' 27 This principal al-
lows the finder of fact to infer that the evidence lost or destroyed, if pro-
duced, would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its loss or
28destruction. As the Arkansas Supreme Court noted, ail Arkansas federal
district court recognized this presumption as early as 1974.29
The Arkansas Supreme Court found this evidentiary principle the most
significant of all the nontort remedies for intentional spoliation because an
aggrieved party can request that a jury be instructed to draw a negative in-
ference against the spoliator.3 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on
Jury Instructions-Civil has since promulgated Arkansas Model Jury In-
struction--Civil 106, which standardizes this principle where there is evi-
dence of intentional loss, destruction, or suppression of tangible evidence by
a party as follows:
If you find that a party intentionally [destroyed] [or] [lost] [or] [sup-
pressed] (description of item) with knowledge that [it] [its contents] may
be material to a [pending] [potential] claim, you may draw the inference
that [the (contents of the) (document) (writing) (photograph) (descrip-
tion of item)] [an examination of it] would have been unfavorable to his
[claim] [defense]. When I use the term "material" I mean evidence that
could be a substantial factor in evaluating the merit of a claim or defense
in this case.
3 1
have done so) in a single conclusory paragraph-ten lines of text summarily responding to
three certified questions from a federal district court. Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756
N.E.2d 657, 661-62 (Ohio 2001) (Cook, J., dissenting).
26. Goff, 342 Ark. at 147, 27 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr., 954 P.2d
at 517).
27. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 389.
28. Id. at n.2, 27 S.W.3d at 389 n.2. This presumption is recognized as a sufficient rem-
edy by a number of states which have refused to acknowledge spoliation of evidence as an
independent tort. See, e.g., Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A,2d 829 (Conn. 1996);
Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr,, Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998); Monsanto v.
Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997); Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 633 So. 2d 1357
(La. Ct. App. 1994); Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761 (Md. App. 1985).
29. Goff, 342 Ark. A 147, 27 S.W.31 at 3%9 6i'iing Carr -v. St. P.'a Fr & Mawrim Im.
Co., 384 F. Supp. 821, 831 (WD. Ark. 1974)). Carr recognized that a jury certainly had a
right to infer that the record[,] had it been retained, would have been useful in determining
the issue of negligence. Carr, 384 F. Supp. at 830.
30. Goff, 342 Ark. at 150, 27 S.W.3d at 391.
31. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 106 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter AMI
[Vol. 27
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
In addition to the evidentiary inference allowed in cases of intentional
spoliation by parties to a lawsuit, the Supreme Court in Goff also noted that
the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure allow various sanctions which may
be imposed at the discretion of the trial court for failure of a party to comply
with an order to provide or permit discovery.32 In addition, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibit lawyers from engaging in "conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [or to] engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 33 It is also a Class B mis-
demeanor in Arkansas if a person "alters, destroys, suppresses, removes, or
conceals any record, document, or thing with the purpose of impairing its
verity, legibility, or availability in any official proceeding or investiga-
tion. ,3
4
Besides these various nontort remedies, the Arkansas Supreme Court
in Goff also discussed the numerous public policy reasons why first party
intentional spoliation should not be adopted as a new tort.35 Specifically,
damages in spoliation cases are inherently speculative, not only in terms of
the amount of damages, but also in terms of whether any injury even ex-
ists. 36 Even if the adverse inference is made, it is impossible to determine
what the lost, destroyed, or suppressed evidence actually would have
shown, or to what extent it would have weighed in favor of the party alleg-
ing spoliation.37 The fact finder would be required to speculate as to what
role, if any, the spoliated evidence would have played in determining the
outcome of the underlying lawsuit.38
Indeed, in the Goff case, the court pointed out that there was no indica-
tion of what had been recorded in the missing logs, or what injury the plain-
tiffs suffered as a result of the destruction of the logs.39 Moreover, the plain-
tiffs won their negligence case in federal district court and it remained to be
seen what additional damages, if any, could have been proven in the state
40
court spoliation case.
Civil].
32. 342 Ark. at 147-48, 27 S.W.3d at 389-90 (quoting ARK. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)).
33. Id. at 148-49, 27 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting ARKANSAS MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) and (d)).
34. Id. at 149, 27 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (Michie Repl.
1997)).
35. Id. at 149-50,27 S.W.3d at 390-91.
36. Id. at 149, 27 S.W.3d at 390.
37. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d
511, 518 (Cal. 1998)).
38. Goff, 342 Ark. At 149, 27 S.W.3d at 391 (quoting Cedars-Sinai Med Cr., 954 P.2d
at 518).
39. Id. at 149, 27 S.W.3d at 390-91.
40. Id. at 149-50, 27 S.W.3d at 391.
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Finally, in emphasizing that it would be unnecessary and unwise to
recognize a separate tort for first party spoliation of evidence, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas quoted a decision from the Supreme Court of Texas as
follows:
This Court treads cautiously when deciding whether to recognize a new
tort. While the law must adjust to meet society's changing needs, we
must balance that adjustment against boundless claims in an already
crowded judicial system. We are especially averse to creating a tort that
would only lead to duplicative litigation, encouraging inefficient reliti-
gation of issues better handled within the context of the core cause of ac-
tion. We thus decline to recognize evidence spoliation as an independent
tort .... [The] traditional response to the problem of evidence spoliation
properly frames the alleged wrong as an evidentiary concept, not a
separate cause of action.4
A. Legislative Reaction to Goff
Despite these admonitions, those in favor of creating new causes of ac-
tion in tort for spoliation proposed House Bill 2432 during the Eighty-
Fourth General Assembly.42 The Bill stated as follows:
16-118-108. Spoliation of evidence.
(a) (1) A person or entity may petition a circuit court of this state, or file a
motion or petition in an existing case in which the alleged spoliation occurred,
for violation of this section if the person or entity has a reasonable belief that
he or she can establish a claim under this section.
(2) All spoliation actions shall be commenced within three (3) years
after the date on which the spoliation occurred or was discovered.
(b) (1) To establish the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence, a party
must prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(A) The existence of a potential civil action;
(B) A legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence relevant to
the civil action;
(C) Destruction of the evidence;
41. Id. at 151, 27 S.W.3d at 391 (quoting Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951-52
(Tex. 1998) (emphasis added by the Supreme Court of Arkansas)).
42. H.B. 2432, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003).
[Vol. 27
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(D) Significant impairment of the ability to prove the potential
civil action;
(E) A causal connection between the destruction of evidence and
the inability of a party to establish an integral part of the potential
civil action;
(F) A significant possibility of success of the potential civil action
if the evidence were available; and
(G) Damages.
(2) (A) If the violation of this subsection (b) is established in a sepa-
rate civil action under this subsection (b), then the court may award
damages to compensate the party harmed by the spoliation.
(B) If the violation of this subsection (b) is raised in pending liti-
gation, then the court may:
(i) Consider the violation in ruling on any pretrial motions,
including motions to dismiss or motions for summary judg-
ment, or making any final decisions in the pending litigation;
or
(ii) Instruct the jury to:
(a) Determine whether the violation occurred; and
(b) Use this determination in its decision on liability in the
pending litigation.
(c) (1) To establish the tort of intentional spoliation of evi-
dence, a party must prove the following by a preponderance of
the evidence:
(A) The existence of a potential civil action;
(B) A potential party to the lawsuit's knowledge of a
possible civil action;
(C) The intentional destruction of evidence designed to
disrupt or defeat the potential civil action;
(D) Actual disruption of the potential civil action;
(E) A causal relationship between the act of spoliation
and a party's inability to establish any part of the potential
civil action; and
(F) Damages.
20051
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(2) (A) If the violation of this subsection (c) is established
in a separate civil action under this subsection (c), then the
court may:
(i) Award damages to compensate the party
harmed by the spoliation; or
(ii) Award damages to punish the party who
destroyed the evidence in an amount not to ex-
ceed five (5) times the actual damages estab-
lished by the party harmed.
(B) If the violation of this subsection (c) is raised
in pending litigation, then the court may:
(i) Consider the violation in ruling on any
pretrial motions, ruling on evidence, ruling on
witness testimony, or making any final deci-
sions in the pending litigation; or
(ii) Instruct the jury to:
(a) Determine whether the violation
occurred; and
(b) Use this determination in its deci-
sion on liability in the pending litigation.
(d) The court may consider whether the party defending
against a petition or motion for violation of this section de-
stroyed the evidence for the following reasons:
(1) In the regular course of business; or
(2) To eliminate a hazardous condition. 43
If it had been enacted, this legislation would have created causes of ac-
tion against first parties and third parties for both negligent and intentional
spoliation. A first party spoliator is often defined as "a party to the underly-
ing action who has destroyed or suppressed evidence relevant to the plain-
tiff's claims against that party."" A third party spoliator may or may not be
a party to the underlying litigation and is alleged to have destroyed evidence
relevant to the plaintiff's causes of action against another defendant(s).45
43. Id.
44. Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1128 (Miss. 2002) (citing
Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 227 (Cal. 1999)).
45. Id. at 1128-29.
[Vol. 27
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B. Ramifications of House Bill 2432 on First Party Spoliation Claims
As discussed above, the Goff decision explained quite convincingly
why it would be unwise to adopt a new cause of action for first party inten-
tional spoliation, such as would have been allowed by House Bill 2432 had
it become law. Numerous courts from other jurisdictions later cited Goff
favorably in likewise declining to recognize a new cause of action for first
party intentional spoliation.46 Thus, if enacted, House Bill 2432 would have
been a tremendous step backward for Arkansas with respect to first party
intentional spoliation.
Had House Bill 2432 become law, trial courts would have been faced
with the numerous difficulties the Goff court sought to avoid because it
would have created separate and duplicate remedies for spoliation. In addi-
tion to the sanctions available under the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
governing discovery in pending litigation, parties asserting spoliation
against their opponents would be able to recover additional damages by
establishing spoliation in a separate civil action.48
For example, a plaintiff could discover during litigation, perhaps years
after the cause of action arose, that certain evidence that might have been
helpful to the plaintiff had been negligently or intentionally destroyed by the
defendant at some point. Even if the plaintiff obtained a verdict against the
defendant on the underlying claim, the plaintiff could still file a separate
civil action arguing that the spoliation discovered during the underlying
lawsuit resulted in the jury not awarding as much compensation as it would
have if the evidence had been available. Of course, if the plaintiff lost the
underlying action, she could file a separate spoliation action and argue that,
but for the loss or destruction of the evidence in question, she would have
won the underlying action and would have received the compensation
sought in the underlying action.
Likewise, a defendant could discover during litigation that the plaintiff
lost or destroyed a product, or parts thereof, which the plaintiff claims to
have been unreasonably dangerous for one reason or another. If a jury ulti-
mately awarded damages against the defendant, a separate action for spolia-
tion could be filed by the defendant claiming that, but for the plaintiff s loss
or destruction of the evidence, the jury would have found in favor of the
defendant on the underlying claim. Damages could include the amount of
the jury verdict in the underlying case.
46. Id. at 1127-28: see also Jost v. Lakeland Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc., 844 So. 2d 656, 658
(Fla. App. 2003); Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 835 So. 2d 1251, 1253-56 (Fla. App.
2003); Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 424-28 (Mass. 2002); Timber
Tech Engineered Bldg. Prod. v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 954 (Nev. 2002).
47. H.B. 2432, at § (c)(2)(B).
48. Id. § (b)(2)(A).
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Under either scenario, boundless litigation could go on for years be-
cause separate actions for spoliation could be filed under House Bill 2432
"within three (3) years after the date the spoliation occurred or was discov-
ered."A9 There is no reasonable diligence requirement, as contained in other
discovery rule exceptions to limitations periods.50 This would allow the type
of duplicative litigation and inefficient relitigation of issues expressly dis-
couraged by the Supreme Court of Texas (as quoted by the Supreme Court
of Arkansas in Gofj) as detrimental to an already crowded judicial system.5'
Such litigation would also result in the inherently speculative determination
of whether actionable spoliation occurred (because the respondent would
undoubtedly assert the affirmative defenses allowed by House Bill 243252),
and if so, what the spoliated evidence would have shown, how another fact
finder would have weighed that evidenced had it been available, and what
amount of money could fairly compensate the aggrieved party.
53
If enacted, House Bill 2432 would have changed Arkansas law even
more dramatically with respect to first party negligent spoliation. As dis-
cussed above, a jury in Arkansas may be instructed regarding the eviden-
tiary inference against a spoliator only where there is evidence of inten-
tional loss, destruction or suppression of tangible evidence by a party.
54
49. Id. § (a)(2) (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(b) (Michie 1987) (allowing actions for
medical injury to be commenced outside the normal two (2) year limitations period where the
basis for the claim is "discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person which is
not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within such two-year period,
[in which case] the action may be commenced within one (1) year from the date of discovery
or the date the foreign object reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is earlier").
51. Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark. 143, 151, 27 S.W.3d 387, 391 (2000)
(quoting Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951-52 (Tex. 1998)).
52. H.B. 2432, supra, at § (d).
53. Goff, 342 Ark. at 151, 27 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998)).
54. AMI CIVIL 106 (4th ed.): see also Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746
(8th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Arkansas law); Tomlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App.
198, 209, 100 S.W.3d 57, 64 (2003) (affirming trial court's decision refusing to give spolia-
tion instruction where there was no evidence that the surveillance tape at issue was intention-
ally destroyed); Rodgers v. CWR Constr., Inc., 343 Ark. 126, 133, 33 S.W.3d 506, 511
(2000) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failinig to give a spoliation
instruction where there had been no finding that the evidence in question had been intention-
ally lost or destroyed); cf. Smith v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233-34 (E.D. Ark.
2000) (drawing an adverse inference in the bench trial of a medical malpractice case not
based upon intentional destruction or loss of tangible evidence, but rather where a physician
merely failed to dictate a post-surgical note). It should be carefully noted that the value of the
Smith decision as precedent in spoliation cases is extremely doubtful rot only because it did
not predicate the adverse inference upon a finding of intentional loss, destruction or suppres-
sion of tangible evidence (as apparently required under the Goff and Rodgers decisions and
as specifically required under AMI 106), but also because the trial court in Smith vacated and
set aside its own rulings in a subsequent order nunc pro tunc. See Smith v. United States, No.
[Vol. 27
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Thus, if House Bill 2432 had been passed it would have transformed first
party negligent spoliation into a full-fledged cause of action, whereas before
such negligence would not have even given rise to a jury instruction on spo-
liation in Arkansas. Adoption of a cause of action for first party negligent
spoliation would have placed Arkansas in the extreme minority of jurisdic-
tions"5 and would have resulted in enormous costs to individuals and entities
which would have been required to undertake unnecessary and expensive
document and material retention policies. 6
C. Ramifications of House Bill 2432 on Third Party Spoliation Claims
The practical and public policy considerations expressed above regard-
ing first party spoliation apply with equal force in regard to causes of action
for third party spoliation. 7 Third parties have no inherent duty to preserve
evidence which may at some point be useful to others. 8 One federal district
court judge examined this issue thoroughly and could find no duty, either
statutory, common law, or assumed, requiring a third party in Arkansas to
preserve evidence for another's use in litigation. 9 Automatic imposition of
such a duty, such as envisioned by House Bill 2432, would infringe upon
the third party's own property rights by requiring the third party to preserve
evidence simply because it might be of use to others in pending or future
litigation.60 As one jurist observed, "[i]t could be a wrecked car, a severed
body part, an item of clothing, a bandage, a dead cat. Who knows?,
61
This is not to say that parties in or anticipating litigation are without
recourse in protecting against loss or destruction of evidence possessed by
third parties. Duties to preserve such evidence may be imposed upon third
parties in various ways. For example, a third party may be required to pro-
duce particular evidence it possesses in response to a subpoena duces te-
cum. 62 This method provides definiteness with respect to the particular
LR-C-99-789 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 23, 2001).
55. Benjamin J. Vemia, Annotation, Negligent Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering with
Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 101 ALR 5th 61, 86-93 (2002).
56. Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1133 (Miss. 2002) (citing
Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 228-32 (Cal. 1999), which gave the
example that "[m]edical [care] providers ... might feel constrained to retain contaminated
surgical devices and by products of medical procedures out of fear of liability").
57. Id. at 1131 (citing Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 227-30).
58. Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Mass. 2002): see also
Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Products v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 954 (Nev.
2002) (noting that there is no duty in tort to preserve evidence).
59. Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (interpreting
Arkansas law), aft'd, 921 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1990).
60. Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 425.
61. Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679, 682 (Ill. App. 1988) (Heiple, J., dissenting).
62. Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 425 (citing MASS. R. Civ. P. 45(b), which is similar to ARK.
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item(s) of evidence that must be maintained and prevents subsequent loss or
destruction of that evidence by the third party. The duty to maintain such
evidence following service of a subpoena duces tecum may be enforced by
court orders, including the sanction of contempt.63 Thus, the existing rule
governing subpoenas may be used to impose upon a third party a duty to
preserve particular evidence, and further provides a remedy if the third party
fails to carry out that duty.64 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
wrote in reference to the subject of subpoenas in declining to create a cause
of action for third party spoliation that "[t]here is no need to invent a cause
of action to enforce a duty when the rules that created the duty in the first
place already provide their own remedies. 65
In addition, a third party may enter into a formal agreement to preserve
a particular item of evidence, and in so doing create an enforceable con-
tract.66 Remedies for breach of contract can be found in existing law.67 Be-
cause contract law already provides a cause of action and a remedy in cir-
cumstances where a contractual duty to preserve evidence has been
breached by a third party, there is no need to create a separate, duplicate
cause of action in tort, as proposed in House Bill 2432.68
These considerations apply primarily to third parties to pending or fu-
ture litigation. Different problems occur in the event of actions brought
against third parties after the conclusion of the underlying litigation. Courts
have been "reluctant to provide disappointed litigants a second opportunity
to seek the compensation they sought in the original lawsuit, even if they
seek it against a party not involved in the original lawsuit., 69 Likewise,
courts have been "reluctant to require courts to provide a forum for parties
who seek to avoid the effect of a prior judgment by asserting that a collateral
wrong improperly affected the verdict."70
The spoliation tort [as against a third party] not only would provide the
disappointed litigant a second opportunity to seek compensation, it would
R. Civ. P. 45(b), governing subpoenas duces tecum).
63. Id. (citing MASS. R. Civ. P. 45(f), which is similar to ARK. R. CIv. P. 45(g), govern-
ing the sanction of contempt for failure to obey a subpoena).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987) (rec-
ognizing that the duty to preserve evidence may be imposed "by reason of an agreement,
contract, statute, or other special circumstance")): see also Timber Tech Engineered Bldg.
Products v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 954-55 (Nev. 2002) (recognizing that a preser-
vation of evidence agreement "created contractual rights and obligations between the parties
to the agreement," although the plaintiff in the case was not one of the parties to the agree-
ment).
67. Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 423.
68. Id.
69. Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 229 (Cal. 1999).
70. Id.
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require retrial of the first case in order to permit the plaintiff to demonstrate
in what respect the alleged spoliation altered the outcome of the first trial.
Indeed, the matter might still continue, for spoliation in the second trial
might give rise to yet a third lawsuit.71
To compound matters further, it may be the case that both parties in the
underting litigation feel that they have each suffered injury due to a third
party's spoliation of evidence, which could give rise to competing claims of
spoliation which could, in turn, result in inconsistent verdicts. 72 Neither
judges nor juries should be called upon to determine who, if anyone, has
suffered an injury where one portion of a document lost through a third
party's spoliation would have favored one party in the underlying litigation
while another portion of that same document would have favored the oppos-
ing party.73 A New York appellate court cited such dizzying scenarios,
among numerous other reasons, in declining to recognize third party negli-
gent spoliation, and concluded as follows:
We thus decline to recognize an inherently speculative and hopelessly
circular cause of action for spoliation where, as here, the act of spolia-
tion was allegedly inadvertent, occurred prior to commencement of the
underlying claim, and was committed by one not a party to the underly-
ing claim and with no relationship, and hence no duty, to Met-Life, the
spoliation plaintiff. Instead, we join the majority of courts that have rec-
ognized the comparative advantages of remedying any injury through
the imposition of carefully chosen and specifically tailored sanctions
within the context of the underlying action. 74
II1. CONCLUSION
The preservation of evidence which might be relevant at some point in
litigation is undeniably desirable.75 Any consideration, however, of whether
to create a new cause of action in tort for intentional and/or negligent spolia-
tion of evidence must take into account the fact that using tort law to rem-
edy misconduct such as spoliation raises issues of practicality and public
76policy unlike those involved in tort remedies created in other contexts.
A number of jurisdictions, including Arkansas, have considered this is-
sue over the last sixteen years. A clear majority of those jurisdictions, in-
71. Id.
72. Mllife Auto & Home v. joe Basil Chevrolet, 753 "N.Y.S.2d 272, 2161D (N.Y. App.
2002), aff'd 807 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 2004) (citing Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 231-32).
73. Id. (citing Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 231).
74. Id. at 282.
75. Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Mare, 831 So. 2d at 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002).
76. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998).
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cluding Arkansas, have concluded that the burdens imposed upon society by
spoliation causes of action outweigh their benefits. Such causes of action
dilute the finality of adjudication by encouraging duplicative lawsuits which
may go on for years. Such causes of action are redundant in light of the nu-
merous other remedies available under discovery rules, evidentiary instruc-
tions, ethical canons and penal statutes for misconduct such as spoliation.
Such causes of action are also inherently uncertain with respect to causation
and damages, giving rise to endless speculation regarding the nature and
extent of harm suffered by victims of spoliation. For all these reasons, Ar-
kansas should not adopt legislation such as House Bill 2432, or otherwise
create new causes of action in tort based upon the properly evidentiary con-
cept of spoliation.
